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We study the collective behavior of interacting agents in a simple model of market economics orig-
inally introduced by Nørrelykke and Bak. A general theoretical framework for interacting traders on
an arbitrary network is presented, with the interaction consisting of buying (namely, consumption)
and selling (namely, production) of commodities. Extremal dynamics is introduced by having the
agent with least profit in the market readjust prices, causing the market to self–organize. We study
this model market on regular lattices in two–dimension as well as on random complex networks;
in the critical state fluctuations in an activity signal exhibit properties that are characteristic of
avalanches observed in models of self-organized criticality, and these can be described by power–law
distributions.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Application of the methods of statistical physics and
nonlinear science to different problems in economics has
been an active area of research in so–called econophysics
[1–4]. This is in part prompted by an interest in charac-
terizing and understanding the various mechanisms that
operate in a market. By virtue of its structure a mar-
ket is a good example of an evolving complex dynamical
system, being composed of a large number of interacting
agents that can be an individual, a group or a firm. The
market forms a network, with the nodes being the agents
while the trading forms the links, with buying and selling
activities giving both direction and weight.
The network paradigm has been very useful in under-
standing interactions in a variety of complex dynamical
systems, and the role of network topology in modifying
the system dynamics has been of interest in earlier studies
[5]. In a market, there are constraints relating to demand
and supply or to available money under which each agent
wishes to maximize profits. An important aspect of the
study of such constrained complex systems is to under-
stand the nature of fluctuations in the collective behavior
that arises from the dynamics of many interacting agents.
It has been shown [6] that the distributions of different
quantities such as price differences and returns have prob-
ability distributions that are non-Gaussian. The need to
comprehend and characterize the mechanisms that op-
erate in a market—in particular stochastic fluctuations,
chaotic variations and nonlinearity—have seen applica-
tions of statistical mechanics to many economic models
and form the basis of predictions in financial markets [6–
11].
Power–law distributions in economic systems are ubiq-
uitous, dating to the early work of Pareto [12] and stud-
ied extensively since the work of Mandelbrot [13, 14].
Given the large number of interacting agents financial
markets are quintessentially complex systems that are
continuously evolving. An early hypothesis for the emer-
gence of power–laws in such systems has been that of
self–organized criticality (SOC) [15–19] which has been
applied extensively to various natural phenomena. Sys-
tems exhibiting SOC are characterized by slow driving
and instantaneous dissipation events thus having sepa-
ration of time–scales, and the system reaches its steady
state, which is an attractor, without tuning of an exter-
nal parameter. Applications have ranged from studies
of earthquakes [20] to species evolution [21], forest–fires
and epidemics [22], neuronal dynamics [23] as well as to
abstract entities in number theory [24]. Indeed one of
the early applications of SOC was to study fluctuations
in an economic model [25].
A highly simplified market model of economic be-
haviour, with agents interacting on a one–dimensional
lattice, was introduced by Nørrelykke and Bak [26] (NB).
Each agent in the market produces a good at a variable
price that can be sold to a neighbouring agent (say on the
left) in order to trade with the agent on the right. Differ-
ences in the demand and supply of goods leads to each
agent finally making a profit, but as trading continues,
the agent with the smallest profit changes the product
price in order to improve earnings. NB showed that while
SOC is attained, the model has a non–stationary attrac-
tor, in contrast to the usual attracting statistically sta-
tionary critical state in most sandpile type models that
show SOC.
In the present work we consider that an agent buys
products and sells goods from/to more than one other in
the market: the trading interactions thus form a complex
network. This generalizes the NB model by incorporat-
ing a feature of real markets, and our interest is in ex-
amining how the properties change with the complexity
of the underlying connections. Furthermore we consider
that agents may have different incomes, leading to differ-
ences in the level of expenditure according to the priority
and capacity of each agent. The network itself becomes
weighted as a consequence; the interaction strengths can
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2differ for each link. We have examined the effect of some
simple choices of weights on the system dynamics and our
numerical results suggest that the SOC features of the
one-dimensional (1D) Nørrelykke and Bak model carry
over to higher dimensions, both for regular networks as
well as for random complex networks with nonlocal in-
teractions.
In Section II of this paper, we present a general frame-
work for the NB model of interacting agents on a spatially
embedded complex network. The evolution rules are also
discussed here, along with a brief description of the var-
ious interaction topologies considered in this work. The
results of our simulations are presented in Section III,
which is followed by a summary and discussion in Sec-
tion IV.
II. THE GENERALIZED INTERACTING
MARKET
We generalize the NB model as follows. Agents inter-
act by trade, namely the buying and selling of goods.
Each agent produces a single commodity that is sold to
a set of customers at a certain price, and goods are pur-
chased from a set of suppliers. The number of suppliers
and customers can vary from agent to agent, and clearly
this forms a general directed interaction network. If the
ith agent has Ki suppliers, the utility function can be
written as [26]
ui = −c(qi) +
Ki∑
j=1
dj(qij), (1)
where the functions c is the cost (or the so-called discom-
fort) and the dj ’s correspondingly account for the “com-
fort” associated with the quantities of commodities pro-
duced qi and consumed qij , respectively. Typically the
function c is convex while d is concave, and since these
are nonlinear functions, a power–law form is a sugges-
tive choice, we take c(q) = q2/2 and d(q) = 2
√
q [26, 27]
in our simulations and analysis below, although the as-
sumption that all agents have the same level of comfort
associated with every good they consume, dj = d is not
a necessary restriction.
The money constraint that operates in the market,
piqi =
∑
j
pjqij , (2)
where pi is the price of one unit good produced by the
ith agent, suggests that for every agent, the total earning
balances the total expenditure.
Agents are aware of the prices charged by their sup-
pliers, and thus the amount that should be produced,
and the amount intended to be purchased can be cal-
culated by optimizing the utility function for the given
money constraint. In order to accommodate the vari-
ability in the number of suppliers and consumers for any
given agent as well as to examine the effect of nonlocal
interactions, both of which are prevalent features of a
real market scenario, we extend the NB model to intro-
duce an expenditure matrix A. The elements aij of A
represent the weights of interactions or the fraction of
earnings that agent i spends on buying a quantity qij of
the goods produced by agent j, namely,
aijpiqi = pjqij . (3)
Clearly, for each agent
∑
j aij = 1, and aii = 0. The
matrix elements of A are choice parameters that specify
the expenditure structure, i.e., what fraction of the total
money earned is to be spent on buying a particular com-
modity. On optimizing the utility function for the ith
agent, Eq. (1), we find that the quantity to be produced
is
qpi =
∑
j
√
aijPij
 23 , (4)
where Pij = pi/pj and the superscript p denotes ‘prod-
uct’. The amount of intended want (superscript w) for
this agent is
qwij = aijPijq
p
i . (5)
The net want or demand of the product of the ith agent
is denoted qWi , and is given by
qWi =
∑
j
qwji. (6)
The total number of terms in the summation is K ′i, the
total number of customers for the ith agent. Since the
net demand of a product does not depend on the net
supply, the minimum of these two quantities is traded,
qti = min{qpi , qWi }. (7)
Each agent earns piq
t
i amount of money, of which the
fraction bij is spent in buying goods from suppliers, hence
contributing to their total earnings. The difference be-
tween the supply and demand of the goods affects the
balance between earning and expenditure of an agent and
therefore there may be a nonzero profit,
si = piq
t
i −
∑
j
bijpjq
t
j , (8)
where bij = q
w
ij/q
W
j .
We keep the same additional assumption introduced
earlier [26, 28], that an agent has enough credit to buy
the permissible quantity (so that the trade would not be
affected due to shortage of money) and that at the end
of each cycle, no liquid money is withheld by agent (to
avoid memory effects in profit calculation).
3FIG. 1: Examples of directed square lattice, for any agent
inward arrows come from her suppliers and outwards arrows
go to her customers: (a) Manhattan (M) lattice, (b) F lattice,
and (c) As suppliers are at right and top sites, we call RT
lattice.
A. Market Dynamics
For a general directed network of N agents, it is neces-
sary to modify the NB update rules in [26] appropriately.
1. Each agent is assigned a random initial price pi for
their product. This price is chosen uniformly from
the unit interval [p, p+1], with p > 0. The elements
ai,j are chosen at random, but are fixed throughout
process.
2. The quantities to be produced and consumed are
computed for every agent, as well as the profit,
which is calculated after computing the quantity
of goods traded.
3. The agent with the least profit is identified and the
price of her goods is reduced by a uniform random
factor η ∈ [0, ηmax].
4. This process is repeated, starting from step 2, and
each time step is assumed to correspond to one
(trading) day.
We consider a variety of network topologies in higher
dimensions. As a first example, we take a 2-dimensional
square L×L lattice with N = L2 agents. Periodic bound-
ary conditions are imposed, and each node or agent has
two suppliers and two customers. We can construct dif-
ferent types of directed square lattices based on the lo-
cation of supplier sites (see Fig 1). The suppliers can
be at two of the following possible sites (with respect to
the agent under consideration): right (R), left (L), top
(T), and bottom (B). In this convention, the position of
the two suppliers could be at any one of the following
six possibilities: RT, LT, LB, RB, LR, and TB. With
these local structures, different directed square lattices
can be constructed, but we focus on the following three,
namely (a) Manhattan lattice: starting from any node
in the lattice, if we traverse a loop of unit area then the
suppliers’ positions for all the nodes involved in the loop
follow a cyclic permutation of {RT, RB, LB, LT} [29].
(b) F lattice: alternate agents have suppliers at LR and
TB positions respectively, i.e., alternate agents can buy
goods from left and right or up and down neighbors. (c)
A topology can be constructed such that the two sup-
pliers are at one of the following combinations: RT, LT,
LB, or RB.
We also consider a directed Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network [30]
spatially embedded in one dimension with a constraint
that each agent has at least one supplier. This is a ran-
dom complex network and each node can have a variable
number of suppliers and customers. However each agent
trades since there is at least one neighbour per site. The
avalanche properties exhibited by the random network
(discussed later) are robust even if this condition is re-
laxed. The average number of suppliers and customers
in the network are equal and related to total number of
nodes as 〈K〉 = 〈K ′〉 = Nα, where α is the probability
to form a link between two nodes. For large N , the de-
gree distribution is binomial while it is Poisson when N
is small.
On a spatially embedded network, as a function of time
the locus of the agent with the lowest profit (the “loser”)
moves at random. This can be described as a discrete
random walk,
~x(t+ 1) = ~x(t) + ~ξ, (9)
where ~x denotes the position coordinate, the jump step is
~ξ. The distance between successive losers’ positions is a
random variable characterized by probability distribution
P (ξ). The risk of incurring minimum profit is transferred
from one agent to another due to one of the two following
possible reasons: a) A supplier of the loser can be at risk
due to local interactions. In order to recover from the
least profit situation, when the loser reduces the price of
her product, the supplier’s production estimate increases
[see Eq. (4)] and this may lead to overproduction. b) Al-
ternately, any agent (including the suppliers of the loser
at the previous time step) can be in the global minimum
profit position at the present time step.
III. RESULTS
Our numerical results show that P (~ξ) obeys the fol-
lowing distribution
P (ξ) =
{
ξ−pi1 , ξ ≤ L/2
|L− ξ|−pi2 , otherwise, (10)
where ξ is the norm of ~ξ and L is linear extent of the
lattice. In Fig. 2 we show the cumulative probability dis-
tribution F (ξ) for regular lattices in 2D. The behavior of
F (ξ) is independent of the choices of ξ, namely, the com-
ponent or the norm. Throughout our numerical studies,
we use initial price interval [10, 11], ηmax = 1%, and the
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FIG. 2: Spatial correlation: Plot of cumulative probability
distribution of distance between consecutive losers for differ-
ent directed square lattices for N = 104 or L = 102, ξ ≤ L/2
and the choice parameter is a = 0.5. The estimated ex-
ponents are, for example on RT lattice, pi1 = 2.59 ± 0.02
pi2 = 1.60± 0.03.
total evolution time is 106 steps. Data is discarded up to
105 time steps to avoid transient effects. Numerical re-
sults also suggest that for a fixed lattice, F (ξ) vs ξ graph
looks similar to Fig. 2, when computed at different values
of the choice parameter a (not shown).
On the other hand, in a random complex network, our
numerical results show that long range spatial correla-
tion feature is destroyed due to existence of non local
interactions. However, the avalanche properties that are
signature of self-organized criticality have been observed
numerically as discussed later.
The dynamics of this market model is driven by a strat-
egy in which agent lowers the price of the product in-
tending to improve profit. Consequently, the evolution
of profit over time shows an effective exponential decay-
ing behavior,
fc(t) ∝ exp(−kt), (11)
where the decay rate or inverse characteristic time k has
an inverse dependence on N . The leading behavior of k
varies as
k = 〈η〉/[N(1− 〈η〉)], (12)
where the angular brackets 〈·〉 denote an ensemble or
time average [26]. Therefore to get a time independent
profit distribution, the profits are scaled to obtain a sta-
tionary profit, fc(t) = fc. Since the system is driven by
a price change mechanism in which agents lower their
prices gradually, it turns out that there is a deflationary
trend.
In the steady state, the profit attains a stationary
value, fc. A threshold value, say f0, is set and start-
ing with the rescaled profits of all agents being above
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FIG. 3: Probability distribution of cluster size S with N =
1024, in 2D for different types of directed lattices. For M, F,
and RT lattices, the choice parameter is fixed at a = 0.25, but
the threshold profits are f0 = −0.042, −0.045, and −0.048,
respectively. The normalized distribution is log binned with
bin width [2r, 2r+1− 1], where r starts from 0, and the size is
chosen as the average of lower and upper values of each bin.
Clearly, the exponent is independent of structural details but
the critical profit fc is affected. For RT lattice the estimated
exponent is τS = 1.33± 0.03 in the range [10, 103].
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FIG. 4: Plot of P (S) for random complex network with
N = 100 at 〈K〉 = 〈K′〉 = 5 and f0 = −0.057. Here, aij
are random number with uniform distribution. The estimated
exponent is τS = 1.38±0.02 in the range [10, 103]. Continuous
straight line drawn for a comparison corresponds to slope 3/2.
the threshold f0, a losing agent can initiate an avalanche
by changing the prices of her goods so as to increase her
profit. Consequently, in the successive updates, the profit
of some agents may fall below f0. At each time step the
number of agents with profit below f0 constitutes an ac-
tivity signal y(t). Clearly this is a stochastic variable,
and in order to analyze such fluctuations, we consider
5the portion of activity signal separated by successive ze-
ros or quiescent periods as an avalanche event, namely,
the condition that y(t) = y(t+ T ) = 0 and y(t′) 6= 0 for
t < t′ < t + T . This event can be characterized by an
observable {X} such as the cluster size S
S =
t+T∑
t′=t
y(t′), (13)
or duration T that denotes the sum of activities and time
spent between two successive zeros respectively. It has
been observed that for critical avalanche processes [31]
the probability distribution of X shows a power–law be-
havior given as
P (X) ∼ X−τX , (14)
where τX is the scaling exponent. The two observables
S and T are related as 〈S〉 ∼ T γST , and this gives a
relationship between the scaling exponents,
τS = 1 +
τT − 1
γST
. (15)
Figures 3 and 4 show P (S) for different market topolo-
gies. As the cluster size distribution exponents in 2D
and random complex network don’t show significant vari-
ation, it seems that the structural detail of network does
not affect the exponent of power law. Further, on a ran-
dom network, the duration exponent is τT = 1.46± 0.04
and it is found to be of the same order in the 2D lattices.
However, the critical behaviour is observed at different
values of the threshold f0 for all the topologies consid-
ered here, thus suggesting that the critical profit is indeed
network dependent. As fluctuations in avalanche activity
can be understood as a critical branching phenomenon
and for mean field branching process [32] (MFBP) the
exponents are exactly known to have values τS = 3/2
and τT = 2. Clearly, this model belongs to a different
universality class.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Here we have studied a simple economic model that
generalizes a one–dimensional market model introduced
by Nørrelykke and Bak to account for an underlying net-
work structure that is a more realistic representation of
trading relationships. Introduction of the expenditure
matrix is an striking feature of our model since it allows
addressing the variability in expenditure structure of an
agent in a real market system. We have numerically in-
vestigated several interaction networks that range from
different regular lattices in two dimension to a random
complex network with variable number of suppliers and
customers. Our studies show that in all these types of
networks the existence of critical avalanche properties is
a manifestation of self–organized criticality. The differ-
ences in structural properties lead to different nonlinear
local interactions, and thus the resulting exponents that
characterize the statistical properties of various quanti-
ties differ from the simple one–dimensional market.
From past studies it is worth noting that many ex-
tremal driven models exist that are known to exhibit
long–range spatial correlations. Examples include the
Bak–Sneppen (BS) model that describes an evolving ecol-
ogy of interacting species [21], the animal mobility model
[33] in which an animal moves to the closest site that
has the largest prey resources, reflecting the maximiza-
tion of foraging benefits and minimization of cost (this is
being driven by optimal search strategies), and the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game that models interacting members
of a population [34]. The emergence of long–range spatial
and temporal correlation is a direct consequence of the
extremal driving mechanism. The extent to which this
is a feature of real markets is a question of considerable
interest.
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